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 OPTIMAL INVESTMENT STRATEGIES FOR LIFELINE SYSTEMS  
UNDER SEISMIC RISKS 
 
Takeshi, KOIKE 
Musashi Institute of Technology 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper describes optimal investment strategies for lifeline systems to prevent structural 
damage due to seismic disaster based on a risk management approach.  
Many existing structures are always threatened by various natural hazards including earthquake loads. 
Actually, those systems constructed prior to 1980 in Japan were designed for a particular seismic load which 
is smaller than a Level 2 earthquake load. After the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu earthquake, revised design 
guidelines were specified, making old infrastructure design fall below acceptable design limits. It means that 
these systems are vulnerable to strong earthquakes in the future. 
In recent years, Japan’s population is shrinking, which has a direct impact into the economy and national 
budget. In view of this, a more rational decision making process is necessary for future investment of seismic 
disaster prevention activities of lifeline systems. In which case, maintenance works must be optimized 
efficiently under the constraint of a limited budget. 
In order to obtain an optimal solution among several alternatives, adequate information required to make 
decisions should be provided in the risk management approach. In this case the incremental cost for each 
seismic investment strategy can be provided in this study. Numerical examples are also provided to 
demonstrate its applicability. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Risk management approach is necessary to compare 
alternative maintenance strategies (Koike, 2005) 
and/or anti-seismic disaster measures for a lifeline 
system such that investment efficiency (Hoshiya and 
Yamamoto, 2005) is secured, where the benefit 
derived from the system, i.e., public welfare in 
monetary terms, income gains, maintenance costs 
and various losses due to earthquake risk are taken 
into consideration.  
This study, therefore, provides the method on how 
to obtain an optimal investment strategy which can 
answer the questions regarding the acceptable level 
of strength and how much is affordable cost. 
Acceptable risk measure and target probability of 
system failure introduced herein are appropriate 
indexes for selecting the optimal maintenance 
strategies. 
The seismic reinforcement of trunk lines or 
transmission networks of major lifeline systems 
(JWWA, 1997) in Japan has been completed in 
recent seismic disaster prevention activities. 
However the distribution and supply networks have 
many vulnerable structural elements, because any 
seismic retrofitting are restricted by huge cost when 
old vulnerable joints are replaced with new 
seismically high performance joints in buried pipes. 
Serviceability at the demand nodes in a 
transmission network is easily estimated with the 
connectivity of the network system from the supply 
nodes to demand nodes. However the serviceability 
of the distribution and supply system is difficult to 
estimate, because of its complex configuration of the 
network and too many demand points from general 
users. 
 
2.  DISASTER PREVENTION STRATEGY  
FOR LIFELINE SYSTEMS 
 
2.1 Net present value of lifeline system 
In assessing the viability of proposed projects, the 
project’s financial balance or net present value 
(NPV) at the end of service period is measured.  
The project with a positive NPV is accepted, while a 
project with a negative NPV is rejected. So the NPV 
at the final stage of the project can be an important 
measure in assessing the risk of a proposed project. 
 The net present value V at the service period T is 
defined as the summation of the social benefit B 
derived from the system, income gains I, daily 
expenditure E, initial cost Co and maintenance costs 
CM, which is given in the following formula. 
( )Moo CCEIBV +−−+=                   (1) 
In the private sector, the social benefit term in 
Eq.(1) does not apply, while public projects do not 
expect income gains in general. Lifeline projects, on 
the other hand, have both terms, because a private 
company has the responsibility in supplying 
indispensable daily services to all the customers 
through the lifeline network system. The income 
gained is used for the daily operation costs, while 
the social benefit is always generated by the 
sustainable operating system.  
If a lifeline system is always threatened by 
seismic hazards, a disaster prevention action must be 
taken in order to keep the system availability with 
an investment Cs to the seismic reinforcement to the 
structural elements of the lifeline system. Then the 
net present value in the risk control phase can be 
expressed by   
( )SMo CCCEIBV ++−−+=                (2) 
If we can adopt the risk finance approach with the 
insurance premium for a business continuation plan 
(BCP), the net present value will be given in the 
following form. 
( ){ }α++−++−−+= mYYCCCEIBV SMo     (3) 
in which α and ,Ym  are insurance rate, 
compensation money and operation fee of an 
insurance company, respectively. 
  Since an earthquake hazard is an inevitable 
phenomenon in Japan, the service loss and 
restoration cost of the lifeline system must be taken 
into consideration during its service period. The net 
present value considering the disaster loss can be 
expressed by 
( ) SIBCCCEIBV SMo −∆−∆−++−−+=     (4) 
where SI   and , ∆∆β are loss of benefit, loss of 
income gain and restoration cost after the earthquake, 
respectively.  
It should be noted that the discussion on the 
discount rate is out of scope in this study in order to 
emphasize the effect of alternative investment 
strategies instead of the discount rate to the net 
present value.  
 
2.2 Target probability of system failure 
Given the probability of earthquake occurrence, the 
net present value can be estimated as an expectation: 
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in which Dj and P[EQ] is the j-th structural 
damage(j=1:minor,j=2:moderate and j=3:major) and 
the occurrence probability of an earthquake EQ. 
Now let us fix the j-th mode to a single damage 
mode. So the probability of structural failure pf  is 
formulated with the performance function Z as 
( )[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]00 <=<= ZPEQPEQDPDDZPp jjjf   (6) 
Then, the expected value hereunder  
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ){ }jjfo DSjDIDBpVVE +∆+∆⋅−=       (7) 
can be related with the pf. 
If seismic investment strategies are discussed 
based on the E[V], one might misunderstand the 
seismic effect because of small loss expectation 
resulting from the small probability of failure. It 
should be noted that the expectation measure is not 
adequate for an extreme and rare phenomena as 
earthquake occurrence. The other approach is to 
introduce the uncertainty in the net present value as 
follows.  
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Now one may define the ratio of the 
probability of the net present values as the 
decision measure of the availability of the 
project under seismic risk: 
[ ]
[ ]0
0
>
>=
oVP
VPγ                           (9) 
The target probability of system failure which 
is appropriate to the positive net present value 
can be given by  
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2.3 Investment for seismic disaster prevention 
Lifeline system must be operated for several years, 
in which Level 1 ground motion will come out at 
least one or two times, while Level 2 ground motion 
always threatens the lifeline system during the 
whole period. For the sake of simplicity, the 
discussion is focused on the seismic disaster 
prevention strategy for a single ground motion. 
Once the network is physically damaged, the 
network system service stops. The loss of service 
corresponds not only to the income loss but also 
social benefit loss.  
 
2.3.1 Structural damage 
Structural damage for a given seismic load is often 
estimated with the fragility curve. The fragility 
curve must be furnished for two different limit states, 
serviceability limit state and ultimate limit state. 
 The major damage mode can be defined as the 
state that the seismic load exceeds the critical 
strength of the ultimate limit state. The fragility 
curve for the major damage mode is given by  
 ( ) [ ]sSSRPsDp majormajorf =<−= 0        (11) 
The minor damage mode, on the other hand, is 
defined as the state that the seismic load is less than 
the critical strength of the serviceability limit state. 
So the fragility curve for minor damage mode is 
expressed by  
 ( ) [ ]sSSRPsDp f =>−= 0minorminor     (12) 
The moderate damage mode is the set which does 
not belong to both of the major and minor damage 
modes. 
Restoration cost for the damaged network after an 
earthquake can be estimated in the following way. 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )dxtxLxDDtC
A
;⋅= ∫ λ                  (13) 
in which A,D(x),L(x;t) and λ[D(x)] are the supply 
district area, damage mode at the location x, stretch 
of the pipeline and restoration cost per unit length. 
 
2.3.2 Seismic disaster prevention 
If a prior reinforcement is done for a network as a 
seismic disaster prevention measure, the physical 
damage is decreased, so that the corresponding 
serviceability damage is also improved.  
In this situation, the fragility curve of major damage 
mode after the reinforcement is given by 
( ) [ ]sSSRPsDp majormajorf =<−= 0ˆˆ          (14) 
The fragility curve for the minor damage mode is 
( ) [ ]sSSRPsDp f =>−= 0ˆˆ minorminor       (15) 
Fig.1 shows the schematic example how the fragility 
curve is improved by the prior reinforcement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Fragility curve shifted by reinforcement 
 
2.3.3 Social benefit 
When the lifeline resumes the operation, the 
social benefit starts. For the sake of simplicity, the 
amount of social benefit is assumed to be 
proportional to the gross domestic production (GDP). 
Fig.2 shows the trend of social benefit during the 
life cycle period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Trend of social benefit during the life 
cycle period 
 
  The loss of benefit is shown in Fig.3 as the 
shaded area when an earthquake occurs at the time T 
and restoration process resulting from structural 
damages of the system resumes up to ∆t. 
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Figure 3  Loss of benefit under seismic damages  
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in which bo is a social benefit per year and is given 
by the ratio of Bo/(TD-To), while GDP(t) and Ak are 
the gross domestic production of the t-th year and 
area of the k-th distribution service district in the 
networks system, respectively. 
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2.3.4 Optimal investment strategies 
In order to select the most appropriate investment 
for the seismic disaster prevention work, there are 
several approaches; 
1)to reinforce the most vulnerable structural 
elements, 
2)to provide the most effective investment which  
increases the positive NPV, or  
3)to furnish the real time control system for the risk 
and crisis management immediately after the quake. 
 
 
3.  STRUCTURAL DAMAGE OF LIFELINE 
SYSTEMS 
 
3.1 Definition of damage modes 
The structural damage states for lifeline network are 
defined as  
(a) Major damage 
  At least one link segment is in a major damage 
state along the lifelines. 
(b) Moderate damage 
  All the segments are not in the minor or major 
damage state along the lifelines. 
(c) Minor damage 
  All the link segments are in the minor damage 
state along the lifelines. 
In the same way, the structural damage states for 
the station system are defined as 
(d) Major damage 
  At least one station is in a major damage state in 
the network system. 
(e) Moderate damage 
  All the stations are not in the minor or major 
damage state in the network system. 
(f) Minor damage 
  All the stations are in the minor damage state in 
the network system. 
 
 The lifeline network system includes supply 
stations, transmission lines, substations and service 
networks to demands. These structures can be 
classified into two typical elements which are 
characterized as links and nodes. Link elements are 
transmission lines and distribution networks, while 
node elements are system control facilities and 
reservoir structures. 
 
3.1.1 Link Element 
Limit state for major damage mode of a link 
element: 
i
major
cr
major
iZ δδ −=                      (18) 
Limit state for minor damage mode of a link 
element: 
i
or
cr
or
iZ δδ −= minmin                     (19) 
Link element can be modeled as a poly-line 
passing through many meshes which belong to 
various soil conditions. One segment which is 
located in a mesh is defined as an element. In Fig.4, 
elements 1, 2 and 3 are located at their own meshes. 
Element 1 and 2 are connected at the mesh 
boundary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 An element model of a passing through 
many meshes. 
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3.1.2 Node element 
Limit state for major damage mode of a node 
structure: 
j
major
cr
major
jZN αα −=                     (20) 
Limit state for minor damage mode of a node 
structure: 
j
or
cr
or
jZN αα −= minmin                     (21) 
The station has its own probability of failure 
which depends on the damage occurrences of 
facilities in the station system. In order to classify 
the undamaged node in the sense of mathematical 
network system from the actual damaged node, the 
undamaged node and fictitious sub-node are 
introduced and the probability of node damage can 
be estimated with that of the facility damage in the 
station.  
Fig.5 is an extended node model with undamaged 
node and fictitious sub-nodes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5  A node model with a fictitious sub-nodes 
 
3.2 Definition of the system damages of the 
network system 
 
3.2.1 Definition of Link and Node Damages in the 
transmission Network Systems  
1)Definition of Link Damage 
It should be noted that a link is a series system 
of several line elements (i.e NLk) connecting 
neighboring nodes. 
Major damage of the k-th link: 
[ ]0
1
<=
=
major
i
NL
i
major
k ZEE
k
U                   (22) 
Moderate damage of the k-th link: 
 I minormoderate kmajorkk EEE =              (23) 
Minor damage of the k-th link: 
 [ ]0minor
1
minor >=
=
i
NL
i
k ZEE
k
I                (24) 
2)Definition of Node Damage 
Major damage of the j-th node: 
[ ]0<= majorjmajorj ZNEE                 (25) 
Moderate damage of the j-th node: 
 I minormoderate jmajorjj EEE =              (26) 
Minor damage of the j-th node: [ ]0minorminor >= jj ZNEE                  (27) 
3)Definition of extended link damage 
An extended link have a series system of a link, 
station and a sub-node as shown in Fig.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 An extended link model 
 
Major damage of an extended link: 
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Moderate damage of an extended link:  
I minormoderate kmajorkj EEE =              (29) 
Minor damage of an extended link: 
[ ] [ ]{ }II 00 minorminor
1
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3.2.2 Definition of structural damage in the 
distribution network system 
A distribution network system has huge networks in 
each mesh. So we focused our attention on the 
structural damages of all the networks instead of the 
system connectivity damage estimations 
  Structural damages of networks are summarized 
with the total number of damage points along all the 
links in each mesh.  
Major damage points of the k-th mesh: 
kl
NL
l
major
kl
major
k Ln
k∑
=
=
1
ν                     (31) 
Moderate damage points of the k-th mesh: 
LinkSubnodeStarting Node
Station Ending Node
Subnode (fictitious)
Node(undamaged)
Facilities in the station
The station system
link
kl
kNL
l
klk Ln ∑
=
=
1
moderatemoderate ν              (32) 
Minor damage points of the k-th mesh: 
 kl
kNL
l
klk Ln ∑
=
=
1
minorminor ν                   (33) 
In which NLk,νkl,Lkl are total numbers of various 
links in the k-th mesh, damage occurrence rate per 
km for each damage mode and the total length of the 
l-th link in the k-th mesh. 
 
3.3 Analytical formulation of the connectivity 
damages of the transmission network system 
 
3.3.1 Definition of connectivity model from the 
M-th node to N-th node 
The t-th connectivity is given as a series system of 
several links, the total number of which is equal to 
tNC . 
( ) ∑
=
= t
NC
Ss
damage
s
MN
t EdamageC
1
              (34) 
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Figure 7  Connectivity model 
 
3.3.2 Definition of the t-th connectivity damage 
among several connectivity systems from supply 
nodes to demand nodes 
Major damage of a connectivity: 
( ) Ut
t
NC
Ss
major
s
MN
t EmajorC
=
=                  (35) 
Moderate damage of a connectivity: 
( ) ( ) ( )minormoderate I MNtMNtMNt CmajorCC =  
(36) 
Minor damage of a connectivity: 
 ( ) It
NC
tSs
s
MN
t EC
=
= minorminor               (37) 
3.3.3 Definition of probability of connectivity 
damage from supply node M to demand node N 
The connectivity from supply node M to demand 
node N is assumed to be equal to NC set of the series 
system which is composed of several links. 
Probability of major damage of a connectivity: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]INC
t
MN
t
MN majorCPmajorCP
1=
=          (38) 
Probability of moderate damage of a connectivity: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]minor1moderate MNMNMN CPmajorCPCP −−=           
(39) 
Probability of minor damage of a connectivity:   
( )[ ] ( )[ ]UNC
t
MN
t
MN CPCP
1
minorminor
=
=          (40) 
3.3.4 Calculation of connectivity from supply node 
to demand node of the damaged network 
Monte Carlo Simulation is used to obtain the 
probability of the connectivity in the damage 
network. As analytical tool, a transfer matrix from 
the supply nodes to the demand nodes is introduced, 
the element of which is composed from the 
probability pMN of the supply node M to the demand 
node N in the damaged network. 
The damage state vector Aj of the nodes after the 
j-th step is given by  
( ) NAjADHA jkjj ,2,1        ,      1 ⋅⋅⋅== −       (41) 
where jko HDA  and , are the initial damage state 
vector of the nodes, the k-th damage modes for all 
the links and the transfer matrix at the j-th step. NA 
is a number of steps in transferring from the source 
nodes to the farthest nodes. 
 
4.  NUMERICAL STUDIES 
 
4.1 Network model 
Structural damage of buried pipelines due to seismic 
effect can be evaluated with relative displacements 
and surface strains in the ground response or 
permanent deformation at the fault crossing or 
uneven settlement in the liquefiable areas. The 
relative displacement δ is calculated in the following 
equation. 
Supply Node (M)
Demand Node (N)
( )



 

 ∆⋅−⋅⋅= l
L
TTS GGV
π
πδ
2cos122     (42) 
in which SV(TG), TG, L and ∆l are velocity response 
spectrum, typical period and its corresponding wave 
length of the surface ground, and unit pipe length 
in meter, respectively.  
Fig.8 is a schematic example of the transmission 
pipelines, while the distribution network is 
connected at several nodes in the transmission 
pipeline. Since the GIS data of the distribution 
network is not available, a simplified rectangular 
mesh model is introduced instead of the real 
distribution networks in order to evaluate both the 
structural and connectivity damages. 
Table 1 shows that each distribution network has 
three kinds of pipelines such as cast iron pipe (CIP), 
ductile cast iron pipe (DIP) and steel pipe (STEEL). 
The pipe diameters ranges from 75 mm to 500 mm. 
The numbers of supply nodes are varied from 2 to 
7 among these seven districts shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Pipeline dimensions of seven distribution 
districts (A,B,C,D,E,F,G) in the water network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The major damage occurrence rate per km along the 
pipeline for a given seismic load s is expressed by  
( ) ( )sDp
l
s majorf
major ⋅∆=
1000ν             (43) 
The nodes of the network system are classified 
into a source in a square and reservoir tank or 
pumping station in a circle in Fig.8. 
A scenario earthquake (Tachikawa fault earthquake) 
of magnitude 6.6 is used as the input force.  
The structural damages of links and nodes in the 
network system can be evaluated with the fragility  
curves for ground responses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 A schematic example of the transmission 
pipelines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CIP DIP STEEL CIP DIP STEEL CIP DIP STEEL CIP DIP STEEL
75 16765 2558 2001 3221 2640 2161 3943 1589 0 4787 6842 0
100 40713 72434 9166 17934 59426 6255 24186 102704 4312 2662 81731 1426
150 15706 44739 2090 5817 18225 2165 5128 32530 4142 8479 23905 3934
200 14391 42334 3833 4604 17464 453 4839 53804 294 4738 20091 1390
250 295 156 37 1624 181 72 1192 54 709 52 53 0
300 9564 18011 6021 7023 6332 331 5836 8637 749 3620 14898 925
350 5254 3676 845 4578 3408 0 5330 7459 206 2820 14049 2121
400 5941 3699 245 3925 2845 0 1539 6285 0 0 0 879
450 1094 7 0 1010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
500 2364 3680 48077 12 101 21572 0 4509 24386 0 5260 23023
subtotal(m) 112087 191294 72315 49748 110622 33009 51993 217571 34798 27158 166829 33698
area(km2)
supply nodes
streets in x-axis
streets in y-axis
CIP DIP STEEL CIP DIP STEEL CIP DIP STEEL
75 4184 1086 0 5828 556 1287 3201 2199 4279
100 22331 94126 2162 20216 139104 1498 10306 155136 2585
150 11143 29079 1546 11640 47331 1658 5017 50006 1620
200 6644 29789 761 7067 32125 683 6870 42076 1084
250 0 0 167 2514 273 0 1203 244 489
300 3004 24901 1166 3116 22456 1398 4064 20104 698
350 0 6155 743 920 4903 1753 5401 17955 254
400 0 506 95 0 5861 93 0 5230 156
450 0 2479 51 0 0 0 0 0 2009
500 0 9995 35482 262 9328 19907 2663 8847 123133
subtotal(m) 47306 198116 42173 51563 261937 28277 38725 301797 136307
area(km2)
supply nodes
streets in x-axis
streets in y-axis
5 6 8
6 7 9
3 5 7
18.6 20.39 23.11
Diameter
Length (m)
E district F district G district
5 5 7 5
5 5 6 4
6 2 3 6
40.25 10.09 14.81 17.1
Diameter
Length (m)
A district B district C district D district
 
The connectivity failure of the transmission network 
controls the serviceability of the distribution and 
supply network system. 
 
4.2 Serviceability analysis 
The network system has intrinsic characteristics that 
the physical damage does not always correspond to 
the connectivity damage because of the redundancy 
of the network. These characteristics are assessed 
for the simplified rectangular meshes of the 
distribution networks in Table 1. Figure 9 shows a 
numerical result of its relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Relationship between physical and 
connectivity damages. 
 
Figure 9 reveals the redundancy effect that the 
physical damage is larger than the connectivity 
damage. Figure 10 shows that the NPV divided by 
Co is calculated by Eq.(4) for various damage 
occurrence rates ν. This result suggests that the NPV 
decreases for larger ν, while the NPV of districts (B) 
and (D) show comparatively better performance 
than those of the other districts. District (A) which 
has the lowest value, on the other hand, is 
effectively improved by the reinforcement for the 
seismic disaster prevention. 
Restoration cost for structural damages at the k-th 
district are modeled as Sk(Dminor)=0 , 
Sk(Dmoderate)=eξκCo, Sk(Dmajor)= ξκ Co.  
in which ξκ is a ratio of the pipe length of the k-th 
district per total elongation of Kawasaki water 
distribution system, and e is a parameter of 0<e<1  
for moderate damage mode. The net present value  
Vo is assumed to be equal to ζCo with a constant ζ.  
 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The optimal disaster prevention strategy is discussed 
for a lifeline system such that investment efficiency 
is secured, where the benefit derived from the 
system, income gains, maintenance costs and 
various losses due to earthquake risk are taken into 
consideration. 
 A case study is implemented to compare alternative 
strategies for the water supply system in Kawasaki 
City. It is found that the water supplying district of 
the lowest value is effectively improved by the 
reinforcement for the seismic disaster prevention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Normalized NPV of the distribution 
networks in seven districts for various damage 
occurrence rates. 
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